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MASS INCARCERATION: THE
OBSTRUCTION OF JUDGES
TRACIE A. TODD*
I
INTRODUCTION
Mass incarceration is a big and well-recognized problem nationwide. There is
widespread agreement that too many people are being incarcerated for too long.
State and federal legislators have passed legislation aimed at reducing rates of
incarceration. In 2018, Congress responded to this crisis through the passage of a
criminal justice reform bill known as “The First Step Act” that implements
reforms aimed at reducing incarceration rates in federal prisons for non-violent
criminal offenders.1 In academic and policy circles, the topic of mass
incarceration has been widely debated. Judges, of course, play a role in that
process. Yet, very little attention has been paid in public discourse to what judges
think about their role in sentencing, and how it relates to mass incarceration.
State and federal judges are responsible for adjudicating criminal cases, and
most importantly imposing sentences. But state courts impose most criminal
sentences. In 2017, roughly 14 million or 95 percent of criminal cases were filed
in state court systems, compared to 75,861 in federal court.2 This statistic
demonstrates the importance of state courts in any discussion relating to mass
incarceration. In this study I interviewed thirty-three judges in starkly different
jurisdictions—Alabama and Massachusetts. Alabama and Massachusetts have
vastly different rates of incarceration. Alabama has one of the highest
incarceration rates in the country, while Massachusetts has one of the lowest. The
study reveals several factors that may attribute the differences in incarceration
rates to the institutional and political contexts in which these judges work and
how it may affect their decisions.
According to the United States Bureau of Justice 2018 statistics, an estimated
2 million people were imprisoned in facilities across the country. The United
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1. Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194(2018).
2. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2018).
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States incarcerates 693 people for every 100,000 Americans on average, placing
the United States as the eleventh highest incarcerator in the world.3 Alabama
itself is within the top five highest incarcerators globally while Massachusetts is
within the bottom five in the United States, and approximately sixtieth in the
world.4
There are roughly 5 million people living in the State of Alabama according
to the U.S. Census Bureau. Approximately 26.8 percent of the state’s population
identified as African American; 4.2 percent identified as Hispanic or Latino; and
65 percent of the population identified as White only.5 In 2016, nearly 30,000
people were sentenced to the Alabama Department of Corrections, or ADOC.6
African Americans made up roughly 54 percent of the inmates housed in ADOC
facilities as well as community corrections, federal, other states, and county jail
custody.7 Alabama does not systematically account for inmates who identify
ethnically or racially as Hispanic or Latino. Instead, it seems that this group is
classified as “White” or “Other.”8 Although incarceration rates have declined,
Alabama still incarcerates approximately 987 people for every 100,000
Alabamians, with prison inmate capacities exceeding 180 percent in recent years.9
As one Alabama judge opined, “In other communities the impact of race [is]
harder to pinpoint, but it’s pretty easy to pinpoint in Alabama.”
In contrast, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with a population of
approximately 7 million incarcerates roughly 330 people for every 100,000
Massachusettsans.10 Although Massachusetts has lower incarceration rates, the
commonwealth is “fairly high up because of racial disparities.” In Massachusetts,
8.6 percent of the population identified as African American; 11.5 percent
identified as Hispanic or Latino and 73 percent of the population identified as
White only.11 African Americans accounted for approximately 27 percent of the
prison population.12 Roughly 25 percent of prison inmates self-reported as

3. Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context, THE PRISON
POLICY
INITIATIVE
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html
[https://perma.cc/PC4G-MNDK].
4. Id.
5. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ALABAMA: RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN (2018).
6. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016).
7. Id.
8. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAM
MANUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR, 2018 (2018).
9. Chris Mai & Ram Subramanian, The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends, 2010–
2015, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (May 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/legacy_downloads/the-priceof-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHT-PJ3V].
10. Wagner & Walsh, supra note 3.
11. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS PRISON POPULATION TRENDS, 2016 (2017).
12. Id.
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Hispanic.13 Like Alabama, more than half of the Massachusetts prison population
is comprised of racial minorities.14
II
THE FRAMEWORK
Studies of criminal justice reform have traditionally examined the impact of
sentencing disparities, systematic deficiencies, inadequate funding, and political
mandates on mass incarceration trends in the United States. Historically, these
studies exclusively analyze the judicial decision making of unelected federal
judges. However, the literature is substantively void of introspective
contributions from key participants in the criminal justice system—state judges.
A closer look at the role of state judges in the context of contemporary mass
incarceration provides myriad academic and practical applications, especially
where there are substantive nonconformities. The State of Alabama and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts squarely fit within this paradigm.
In both Alabama and Massachusetts, the district and trial courts have
jurisdiction over criminal sentencing. Although there are some institutional
differences in the authorities vested in each jurisdiction, judges in these courts
are responsible for sentencing criminal offenders. According to the Alabama
Administrative Office of Courts, there are 245 circuit and district court judges
vested with jurisdiction to decide criminal cases.15 Judges in Alabama are
selected through a partisan election process for a six-year term.16 Political pundits
describe Alabama as a conservative, red state associated politically with the
Republican Party.17 In Massachusetts, there are 344 comparative judicial offices,
including 249 superior and district court judges vested with jurisdiction in
criminal cases.18 Massachusetts judges are selected by gubernatorial appointment
for a permanent term with a mandatory retirement age of seventy. Massachusetts
is described politically as a socially progressive, blue state associated politically
with the Democratic Party.19
I individually interviewed a total of thirty-three Alabama and Massachusetts
trial and district court judges. The judges were interviewed with the stated
condition of anonymity. I gave preliminary instructions regarding the study topic

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. This information was provided by the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts via a direct
email request to the human resources department.
16. ALABAMA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT &
STATISTICS (2017), (on file with the Journal).
17. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PARTY AFFILIATION BY STATE (2014); Pat Roberts & Mark
Begich, How Red or Blue is Your State?, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2014), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballotbox/house-races/221721-how-red-or-blue-is-your-state [https://perma.cc/M2ZA-Y9F2].
18. MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT, MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT ANNUAL DIVERSITY
REPORT (2017). Boston Municipal Court also has concurrent jurisdiction over some felony offenses.
However, there is no comparable structure in Alabama.
19. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 18; Roberts & Begich, supra note 18.
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and expressly explained my role as researcher to counteract assumptions about
my knowledge of the subject matter as a sister judge. All judges gave extremely
candid and complete answers. During the interviews, the words “conservative”
and “progressive” peppered the responses in political and social contexts.
Focusing on introspective judicial decision making and institutional features, I
started the interviews asking for a broad definition of criminal justice reform to
establish a framework for the judges and identify common themes. There were
four main topics for the judges to consider: 1) Responsibility for criminal justice
reform; 2) Effectiveness of current reform efforts; 3) The judge as participant in
reform; and 4) The judicial selection process. Nevertheless, some judges,
especially my Alabama colleagues, tended to presume my awareness. In these
instances, I gave intermittent explanations of my role as researcher. However,
the interviews, designed to last one to one-and-a half hours, averaged forty-five
minutes to an hour.
Most interviews were conducted by phone. As a current member of the
bench, I drafted questions based on existing literature and commonly expressed
concerns among colleagues. I was looking for patterns in the responses primarily
from judges outside of my jurisdiction to counter slants toward possible
preconceptions based on jurisdictional homogeneousness. Alabama judges
voluntarily responded to my direct email request. Requests for participation in
Massachusetts were made through two intermediaries, a court official and a law
professor. More Alabama judges were interviewed than Massachusetts judges.
More trial judges were interviewed than district judges in both jurisdictions. Still,
the voluntary response created a diverse pool with varying age, race, gender,
experience and political affiliation.
The judges related factors that may correlate high rates of incarceration with
judicial attitudes and sentencing practices. The interviews provided vital
information explaining perceived obstructions caused by politically motivated
legislative mandates, inadequate funding, and the respective judicial selection
processes. The responses are presented in aggregate. Anonymous quotations are
included to clearly express areas of consensus and jurisdiction specific
discussions. As a member of this professional group, I also added quotations as a
quality control measure to assure the reader that the expressed views are solely
those of the participants.
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III
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SELECTION PROCESS
One of the most obvious factors to consider in the discussion of mass
incarceration between the Alabama and Massachusetts justice systems is the
starkly different judicial selection processes. Alabama judges are selected by
contested partisan election. Judicial candidates for office at all levels of the
judicial system are required to qualify with a political party or adhere to
requirements for independent candidates.20 For over two hundred years, judges
in Massachusetts have been selected by gubernatorial appointment to serve a
lifetime appointment, now with a mandatory retirement age of seventy.21 The
opposing judicial selection processes may be the most prominent factor when
considering the diverging incarceration rates.
All Alabama judges rebuffed or tepidly considered the idea of an appointment
process. Massachusetts judges homogeneously rejected the proposition of a
contested election as a judicial selection method. Nevertheless, the responses
suggested that the judicial selection processes may influence sentencing decisions
that affect the respective rates of incarceration.
Participants affiliated with the Democratic Party made up 52 percent of the
judges interviewed from Alabama, and the remaining 48 percent affiliate with the
Republican Party. Although Massachusetts judges are appointed, 60 percent of

20. ALABAMA LAW INSTITUTE, ALABAMA ELECTION HANDBOOK 2017-2018 (2018).
21. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION: MASSACHUSETTS
(2014).
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the participants in this study were appointed by Republican governors. The
remaining 40 percent by Democratic Governors.

A. The Election
Alabama judges commonly believe that the partisan component of the
judicial selection process may negatively influence sentencing decisions and
contribute directly to the state’s overcrowded prison system.22 Generally,
Alabama judges pointed to the partisan component of the selection process as
problematic, or at least concerning, in a state where straight party voting
dominates judicial races. One judge summarized this notion stating, “when
you’re…associated with [a] particular party…it’s just not a good visual for the
general public…it seems ridiculous on its face to say that you’re one or the other
when you’re supposed to be totally unbiased.” Described in religious terms by
another judge, “judges should be non-denominational.” The significance of this
acknowledgement relates directly to judicial attitudes among Alabama judges
about sentencing practices. Although expressed objectively, most Alabama
judges believed that “there is some correlation between” the judicial selection
process in Alabama, “how [judges] impose punishment,” and Alabama’s prison
population. Democratic judges inferred that their Republican counterparts
experience more community pressure to be “tough on crime.” One judge candidly
described this inference in a distinctly political science context:
[A] judge is going to serve in the community that he’s a part of by and large…[I]f that
is a more moderate or liberal or conservative community, then typically that judge, will

22. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan Elections of Judges Produce Unequal Justice When Courts
Review Employment Arbitrations?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1569, 1569–1616 (2010).
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serve the needs [of that community]. We don’t have our own goal; we have to serve the
goals of our constituents. Judges are [required] by law as far as what they can do, but
for the most part they are serving the people of that community. So, you have to sort of
acquiesce in a sense to what that community needs and what they want you to do as an
elected official.

In affirming this point, there were repeated references to fears of special
interest groups running “Willie Horton” political advertisements. The premise of
the “Willie Horton” ad, ironically based on a Massachusetts case, centers on a
judge releasing an offender from custody who then commits a heinous crime after
release. In summary, one judge explained:
In six years [judges] stand for reelection and some lawyer out there decides…to say…he
is soft on crime...she’s talking about rehabilitating somebody who’s a rapist, who’s a
murderer, who’s a robber, you know. So, if you note that in the back of your head and
you know that another lawyer could use that in a campaign…you’re going to be a little
bit more cautious about that. May not be quite as ambitious…If I lose the election, then,
you know, I don’t have a platform at all to try to help, educate the community, educate
other lawyers, judges [or] the legislature as to what needs to be done in this criminal justice
system.

Although Alabama judges acknowledge that there is likely a correlation
between the role of a judge as a partisan political figure and the overcrowded
prisons in Alabama, the judges unanimously expressed contentment with some
form of an election process. Each judge was generally “opposed to appoint[ing]
judges” citing perceived hindrances to minorities and socio-economically
disadvantaged Whites being appointed by a governor. Therefore, most Alabama
judges believe that the selection of judges is “within the province of the people.”
However, there was a consensus among Alabama judges that partisanship and
the public demand for tough-on-crime punishment probably influence sentencing
decisions and thereby contribute to incarceration rates.
B. The Appointment
Under Massachusetts law, “[a]ll judicial officers . . . shall be nominated and
appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council.”23
In 1975 a formalized merit-based selection process was created for the appointment
of judges.24 Massachusetts judges unanimously and enthusiastically touted the
judicial appointment process. The judges attribute the quality of the
Massachusetts judiciary to the rigors of the merit selection process. The judges
expressed in varying degrees an aversion to the idea of judicial elections. Most
judges believe that the judicial appointment process insulates them from the
political pressures associated with answering to an electorate, “no one can either
implicitly or explicitly threatened you with your job”. Likewise, Massachusetts
judges describe an independence that allows them to exercise judicial discretion
without fear of electoral retribution with respect to sentencing decisions.

23. MASS CONST. ch. 2, art. IX.
24. Martin W. Healy, A Guide to the Massachusetts Judicial Selection Process: The Making of a
Judge, MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION (2015), https://www.massbar.org/docs/defaultsource/advocacy/mjsp-3-ed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/7M2Y-9PQ6].
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“Massachusetts judges are very proud and feel very strongly that the [merit
selection process] gives us the opportunity to be independent [and] true to the
law without worrying about public clamor.” There was an overwhelming
presumption among Massachusetts judges that the gubernatorial appointment
process insulates the judiciary from political considerations that may influence
sentencing decisions, which corresponds with decreasing incarceration rates.
IV
RACE AND SOCIOECONOMICS
In addition to variances in judicial selection, considerations of race and
socioeconomics are also routinely debated in the context of mass incarceration.
Theoretically, neither race nor socio-economics should affect sentencing in a
blind justice system. But the responses given by the judges suggested that these
factors are considered in sentencing decisions at least in the margins and where
judges have discretion.
It is well settled that racial minorities, especially African Americans and
people of Latino descent are incarcerated at higher rates than Whites.25
According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2017 13.3 percent of the
American population identified as African American; 17.8 percent identified as
Hispanic or Latino and 61 percent identified as White only. However, in July of
2018, African Americans made up almost 40 percent of the total prison
population.26 In examining criminal justice reform in this context, there was
consensus among judges in both jurisdictions that “disparit[ies] in sentencing”
serve as a primary contributor to mass incarceration. Therefore, reducing “racial
disparities in sentencing” was deemed an indispensable aim in reforming the
criminal justice system and reducing incarceration rates. Nationally, opposing
factions cite varying economic, social or political rationales in support of criminal
justice reform and the need for reduced incarceration rates.27
The bi-partisan debate relating to mass incarceration has been fueled to some
degree by the growing opioid crisis in the U.S.28 There was a presumption among
the judges that the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing should not be
“influenced by a person’s race, economic status or the implicit bias of the judges.”
The criminal justice system should be “blind to race and other extraneous”
considerations. But race was also discussed in direct relation to the government
and public efforts to reform the criminal justice system in response to this crisis.
In summarizing a viewpoint shared by others, one judge explicitly associated the
25. Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2016), https://www.senencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TheColor-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KM9-CN8Y].
26. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE RACE STATISTICS (2018).
27. Cameron Smith, We Need Better Solutions than ‘Big Government’ Incarceration, AL.COM (Mar.
16,
2017),
http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/03/we_can_do_better_than_the_big.html
[https://perma.cc/6A44-BM3H].
28. James G. Hodge et al., Redefining Public Health Emergencies: The Opioid Epidemic,” 58
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1–17 (2017).

TODD - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2019]

4/9/2019 4:51 PM

MASS INCARCERATION

199

legislative efforts to combat opioids with the drug epidemic now becoming a
“White problem.” This viewpoint centers on the crack epidemic, which
disproportionately affected the African American community in the early 1980’s
and 1990’s, when defendants charged with crack related offenses “were getting
some long sentences.” Another judge explained, “[o]nce [drugs] became a white
problem . . . we weren’t just locking people up to solve the problem.” Disparate
enrollment in deferred sentencing programs was also cited in relation to race and
sentencing practices. A sampling of Massachusetts Drug Court programs
revealed that 87 percent of Drug Court participants were White, even when the
court is in a predominately African American community.29 According to one
Massachusetts judge, “There’s a lack of diversity in our drug courts . . . that’s
tough for people to . . . take a real look at the issue of race[.]”
In addition to racial disparities, each judge referred in varying ways to “a
direct relation with poverty and crime.”30 According to the United States Census
Bureau, the median income in Alabama is $44,758.00, and educational
attainment is below the national average. Correspondingly, Alabama has one
of the highest violent crime rates in the United States.31 Conversely, the median
income in Massachusetts is $70,954.00, and educational attainment is above the
national average.32 Likewise, Massachusetts has an average or below average
crime rate.33 Relating to race, judicial decision making may be influenced to some
degree by the reality that “judges bring their own experiences with them.” In
considering matters of race and socio-economics in the context of judicial
attitudes about criminal justice reform, one judge candidly explained:
[Y]our personal life experiences are [your] teacher and if you have never been around
groups of people less fortunate than yourself or you have never even had the
opportunity to experience groups of people less fortunate than yourself, then you are
shaped…that’s your world. I think it’s hard for people to understand folk less fortunate
than them. Most of the time the only interaction [judges] have with people of color or
people who are less fortunate than them are in these jobs and it’s just hard for them to
care about criminal justice reform.

V
OBSTRUCTIVE LEGISLATION
While judges are authorized to exercise some discretion in sentencing, the
discretion is not unconstrained. It has long been concluded that the mass

29. Shira Schoenburg, Participants in Massachusetts’ Drug Courts are Overwhelmingly White,
MASSLIVE (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/participants_in_
massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/8E3D-X8JJ].
30. Stephanie Hong, Say Her Name: The Black Woman and Incarceration, 19 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 619, 627 (2018).
31. Leada Gore, Alabama’s Place on the List of Most Dangerous States, AL.COM (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.al.com/news/2018/11/alabamas-place-on-the-list-of-most-dangerous-states.html
[https://perma.cc/7H7W-943K].
32. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS: QUICK FACTS (2018).
33. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, 2016
(2019).
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incarceration phenomena in the United States occurred as a direct result of the
pivot from a rehabilitative criminal justice system to a retributive, draconian
criminal justice system.34 Even a glancing analysis of mass incarceration in all fifty
states confirms incarceration rates higher than those of countries and territories
internationally condemned as human rights violators.35 The retributive policies
of the 1990’s War on Drugs and its offshoots placed federal and state legislative
“tough on crime” mandates primarily on judges, especially state judges.36
A. Tough-on-Crime
Mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines have become the most
prominently scrutinized tough-on-crime mandate, and widely credited for
exponential increases in incarceration rates. Under the mandatory minimum
sentencing structure, judges have no discretion in the minimum prison sentence
imposed for certain crimes. Judges in both jurisdictions unanimously attributed
high prison incarceration rates in significant part to tough on crime mandates.
“Some judges are of the view that if not for that mandatory minimum, they might
come up with a different sentence that might be more appropriate for the
particular offender.” Mandatory minimum sentencing was perceived among
judges in both jurisdictions as a practical obstruction to effective sentencing
strategies. Mandatory minimum sentencing was described by one judge as
“shift[ing] discretion from the judge to the prosecutor.” The judges intuitively
used low level drug crimes as the foremost example of the negative impact on
prison populations caused by mandatory minimum sentencing. In discussing this
universal frustration with the adverse effects of mandatory minimum sentencing,
one judge explained:
“We first […] have to decide what we’re going do. Are we going to treat everybody as
if they are a dangerous major drug dealer? Are we going to carve out for those persons
who are addicted[,] who are as much a victim of the drug? Are we going to incarcerate
them for the duration of their life as we would a major dangerous [offender]?

On this point, there was consensus that mandatory minimum sentencing
related to drug offenses, mental illness, and “spin off” crimes creates an
unworkable mandate on judges. Reportedly, the divesting of discretion here
impedes the judges’ ability to tailor sentences to specific circumstances. “It’s not
going to work . . . unless you tailor it to each person’s case individually.” In other
words, the judges correlate mandatory minimum sentencing with the inability to
effectively address substance abuse and mental health illness in the criminal

34. Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past
Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–22 (2003); Mark R. Fondacaro, The
Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile and Criminal Justice: New Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 697, 697–726 (2015).
35. Wagner & Walsh, supra note 4; New York Times Editorial Board, Justice Reform in the Deep
South, N. Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/opinion/justice-reform-in-thedeep-south.html [https://perma.cc/UX7C-Z3K4].
36. William N. Clark, The Criminalization of America, 76 THE ALABAMA LAWYER 224, 224–232
(2015).
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justice system. In support of this view another judge stated, “[i]f you look at the
population in the prisons…, overwhelming numbers…have either substance
abuse or mental illness or both. If you could treat all of that effectively, you could
close a lot prisons and prevent a lot of crime.”
B. Judges as Lobbyists
The judges believed good a legislative-judicial relationship to be critical in the
creation of legislation that allows them to use their discretion “to help people.”
The judges collectively acknowledged a subjective role in criminal justice reform
and reducing incarceration rates. One of the many judges who addressed this
point affirmed that “[W]e can put a face to it. We see it day in, day out. We see
individuals. We see the lives that have been destroyed…victims, defendants and
their families. So . . . it’s personal.” Both Alabama and Massachusetts legislatures
have recently passed measures to address mass incarceration and the resulting
fiscal and social burdens placed on each prison system. But the legislation passed
in each jurisdiction looks different, and so do the legislative-judicial
relationships.37
Every judge identified the legislature as having primary responsibility
because criminal justice reform primarily “lives within the prerogative of the
legislature.” This presumption was based on the legislature’s power of pen and
most importantly purse. B u t t he public’s demand for punishment was uniformly
identified as the leading influence on legislative decision making and the
enactment of retributive mandates, making matters of reform “all politics.” When
discussing perceived impediments to substantive criminal justice reform, across
the board the judges pointed to the political pressure of legislators being labeled
“soft on crime.” One judge explained that the Nixonian tough-on-crime mandate
“plays well with the public and the legislature,” encouraging retention of
retributive sentencing policies that exponentially increase incarceration rates.
Generally, judges in both jurisdictions optimistically believed that increased
awareness among the electorate and legislature would encourage a more
dramatic shift away from a “tough on crime” approach toward a more effective
“smart on crime” strategy. The process of educating the legislature revealed
interesting discussions about the judiciary’s interaction with the legislature. Both
state and commonwealth cannons of judicial ethics make allowances for judges
to engage in discussions with legislators and the public on matters concerning the
court. There are no statutory or ethical constraints on judges initiating contact
with the legislature to discuss topics relating to sentencing and criminal justice
reform generally. But the strategies exercised in the jurisdictions are starkly
different, as is the resulting criminal justice legislation that directly correlates
with mass incarceration rates.
Alabama judges described an unorganized hodgepodge of methods used to
influence legislators. The kaleidoscope of methods included direct contact with

37. See Appendices A & B.

TODD - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

4/9/2019 4:51 PM

202

[Vol. 82:191

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

respective legislators, submission of opinion editorials, lobbyists retained by the
circuit and district judges’ associations, communications by way of the presiding
judges of each circuit, and direct appeals to the community through public
discourse and presentations. There was no consensus among Alabama judges on
the effectiveness of any one method or combination of methods employed to
educate lawmakers. Alabama judges, in stark contrast to their commonwealth
counterparts, described historic and contemporary conflicts in legislature-judicial
branch relations that have created an “indifference toward the judiciary.” Despite
an unbridled ability to communicate with legislators, Alabama judges generally
believed that input from the judiciary was not adequately considered in the most
recent criminal justice reform legislation. In affirming this point one judge
explained, “In order for us to get our prison populations down or criminal justice
reform, if that is important to our state, we’ve all got to talk.” Another judge
explained, “We need to look at evidence based practices as a basis for the way
we do the reform.” But the consensus among Alabama judges was that there is
“a disconnect between the legislature and the judicial branch.” Alabama judges
universally acknowledged problems with the disjointed legislature-judiciary
communication processes, coupled with inherent political considerations. There
was agreement among Alabama judges that critical judicial input in the criminal
justice legislative process has been impeded. As a result, Alabama judges
describe criminal justice policies that “play[] well with the public,” but may not
adequately reduce the state’s prison population.
Although Massachusetts judges are permitted to individually communicate
with legislative officials, most did not find such a proposition necessary and gave
great deference to “tradition.” There was a clear aversion among Massachusetts
judges to individually engage legislators, telegraphing a rank and file mindset in
this regard. One Massachusetts judge explained the universal commonwealth
sentiment stating, “I’ve just never felt comfortable in our role of addressing the
legislature . . . So we try to let the chiefs of the departments along with the chief
of the appeals court and the chief of the [Supreme Judicial Court] do the speaking
for us.” Each Massachusetts judge described a positive relationship between the
legislature and judiciary. Although there has been “some fluctuation” there has
been a positive “consistency” with legislature-judiciary relations. Overall,
Massachusetts judges believe that “there’s a lot of respect for the judiciary and
that “historically there’s no animosity between branches.” The reported
amicability between these branches of government may be attributed in part to
the regulated interbranch communication system. Collectively, Massachusetts
judges perceived the judiciary to be a respected branch of government. In support
of this belief one Massachusetts judge explained that “the legislature has tried to
be very cooperative with us and responsive . . . I think they have[.]” The judiciary
reportedly had a significant role in the debate and drafting of the
commonwealth’s most recent criminal justice reform legislation. Supreme
Judicial Court leaders served as key advisors and liaisons throughout the process.
The judiciary worked with the Governor, and legislative leaders to introduce
legislation based on a comprehensive study of the Massachusetts Court System
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conducted by the Council on State Governments. In affirming this point one
judge explained, “Our chief justice of the supreme judicial court has been quite
outspoken about proposing changes in law that would give judges more
discretion about sentencing [and] make sentencing more evidence based.”
Massachusetts judges described the judiciary as a non-partisan, respected and coequal branch of government that utilizes a uniformed communication system to
sustain positive legislature-judiciary relations. This perception corresponds with
the judiciary’s prominent role as a participant in drafting criminal justice reform
legislation that may prove to effectively reduce incarceration rates.
VI
JUDICIAL TRAINING
Perhaps surprisingly, another factor that may affect sentencing decisions
among the judges is the training that they receive after taking the bench. Here,
there was a striking difference between Alabama and Massachusetts judges in
relation to sentencing decisions and continued judicial education. In both
jurisdictions, judges who reportedly practiced “little criminal law,” if any, prior
to becoming a judge discussed the learning curve in this new area of substantive
law and the importance of judicial education. But, judges with substantial
criminal law experience also considered judicial training vital for judges to “know
what to do.” Here deviating practices surfaced creating an interesting
consideration in the analysis of mass incarceration and sentencing decisions.
Newly elected judges in Alabama may electively participate in a state
sponsored orientation that typically commences over a two to five-day period.
These judges are also encouraged to attend the two-week general jurisdiction
course at the National Judicial College. The state pays the expenses for this
training through dedicated funds and scholarships. As announced in 2013, all
other judges are exempt from continuing judicial education requirements.38 One
judge explained that training is “not mandatory [in Alabama] because they can’t
afford to pay for us to go. So, it’s limited.” Nevertheless, the Administrative
Office of Courts in collaboration with the judicial program committee
coordinates most of the elective in-state training opportunities for judges at the
semi-annual state judicial conference. Over the years, Alabama prison reform
has occupied a vast space in judicial training discussions. But, according to a
conference presenter, some judges may have been “overwhelmed” by the topic.
So, “very little criminal law” was offered at recent trainings. As a result, concern
was expressed that judges are not receiving training on proper application of
criminal laws especially relating to sentencing. In expressing this view, one
Alabama judge opined,
We’re called upon to handle issues of life and death and there is no mandatory
training…for [ ] judges. [T]here should be mandatory training for us. But even if it’s not
mandatory, I think most good judges want training and we can’t even get it. I don’t even
38. This information came from a set of emails sent at the author’s request to the director for judicial
training at the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts.
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think we would need to rewrite laws if we just had adequate training…yearly judicial
training, but good judicial training, not training that is led by a judge just because he has
been a judge for 25 years. I mean, good judicial training.

Another judge explained,
The state overall does the best that they can do[.] There’s just so many complexities that
they really can’t educate you on everything…We do a pretty good job. Could we do
better? Yes, we could always do a better…but maybe it’s up to the department of
corrections to say, hey, we’re overcrowded. We’ve got these other options for
sentencing…Responsibility rests with a number of individuals.

There was little mention of training opportunities outside of the biannual
state judicial conference and the general jurisdiction course at the National
Judicial College. Overall, state sponsored training for judges was believed to be
important for fundamental understanding, accurate implementation of criminal
laws and sentencing practices that avoid exacerbating incarceration rates.
In contrast, judicial training in Massachusetts is a combined mandatory and
elective system. Training for new commonwealth judges includes a two-year
curriculum that focuses on mentorship, orientation, and in-class presentations on
relevant subject matter.39 One Massachusetts judge commended the training,
stating, “I didn’t realize as a lawyer that there was that sort of collegiality and
support among the judges and that’s impressed the heck out of me.” Senior
Massachusetts judges attend elective and mandatory “regional meetings like four
times a year” organized by the judicial leadership. Training on specific subjects
such as race and implicit bias have been made mandatory for all Massachusetts
judges. Expenses for judicial training are funded by the state. Additional judicial
training is offered at the Flaschner Institute, a center established for educating
commonwealth and federal judges in Massachusetts offering more than thirtyfive training opportunities on different areas of substantive law and specialized
subject matters throughout the year. In addition to judicial training, the
Massachusetts Superior Court leadership collaborated efforts between the
judiciary, prosecutors, defense counsel, the legal academy and the legislature to
study and develop evidence-based practices for the trial court. In 2016, the
Massachusetts Superior Court published Best Practices for Individualized
Evidence-Based Sentencing. The Best Practices guide provides instruction for
superior court judges to identify
[F]actors relevant to the imposition of a committed sentence, to alternatives to a
committed sentence, and to supervision upon release…probation, including use of a
risk/assessment tool to determine the level of supervision…identify conditions of
probation that…decrease recidivism; and…probation violations, to ensure that a
probationer is held accountable in a timely and proportional manner.40

The Best Practices guide was well received among superior court judges,
Eepecially those with “very little criminal law” experience prior to taking the
39. The information was provided in the 2017 Judicial Education in the Trial Court inter-court
memorandum disseminated by the chief judges. Memorandum from State Trial Court Chief Judges on
Judicial Education in the Trial Court (2017) (on file with author).
40. MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, BEST PRACTICES FOR INDIVIDUALIZED EVIDENCEBASED SENTENCING (2016).
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bench. They described the guideline as helpful. Many explained that it provides
consistent and proportional sentencing practices across the Massachusetts court
system. Although this guide is not mandatory, most trial judges find it to be
helpful and follow the guideline “closely.” For these judges, the Best Practices
gives “guidance from people who know what works and what doesn’t work” in
making effective sentencing decisions and reducing the incarceration rate.
VII
CONCLUSION
The plight of mass incarceration has forced opposing policy makers at the
federal and state levels to address specific problems like prison overcrowding,
albeit for varying philosophical reasons. Conservative-leaning policy makers
explain the need for criminal justice reform primarily in terms of economic
hardships.41 Many progressive or liberal-leaning policy makers point to social
injuries caused by mass incarceration.42 However, it is a generally accepted
premise across the political spectrum that the current rates of mass incarceration
are fiscally unsustainable. In other words, “the public doesn’t want to build more
prisons, [and the] legislature doesn’t have money to build prisons.”
As a general premise, it can be concluded from this study that legislative
mandates and institutional features may affect judicial discretion in sentencing.
The conclusion relates directly to the widely divergent incarceration rates in
Alabama and Massachusetts. The study revealed variations in attitudes,
practices and policies that judges as actors in the criminal justice system believe
to be obstructive to efforts aimed at reducing incarcerations rates. Judges
perceive themselves as intermediaries between the criminal justice system and
the communities to which most offenders will be returned. Therefore, any
genuine effort to effectively reform the criminal justice system and reduce
prison populations must include substantive involvement of state judges.
Overcrowded prisons have necessitated reform of the criminal justice system.
While this study centered on surface level political mandates and institutional
features, the study of state judges as participants in the criminal justice system is
vastly unchartered territory. Further study of these key actors in the criminal
justice system is ripe for original contribution to the literature, and perhaps a
missing consideration in the criminal justice and mass incarceration debate.

41. Fondacaro, supra note 35.
42. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 423–468 (2013).
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APPENDIX A: RECENT ALABAMA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM LEGISLATION
2015
Criminal
Justice Reform
Council of
State
Government
Summary of
Al.S.Bill 67

Strengthen community-based supervision to reduce
recidivism.
 Standardize the use of risk and needs assessments to
target supervision resources for people who are most
likely to reoffend, and reduce probation and parole
officers’ caseloads by prioritizing intense supervision
for people more likely to reoffend and providing
limited supervision for people less likely to reoffend.
 Establish intermediate sanctions to respond to
technical violations of probation and parole, and allow
for short jail stays prior to revocation in the range of
possible sanctions.
 Improve the quality of Community Corrections
Programs (CCPs) by creating a new funding standard
for CCPs that sets appropriation levels based on the
degree of implementation of evidence-based practices.
 Allow people on supervision who have lost their
driver’s licenses as a result of their convictions to apply
for a driver’s license with limited driving privileges.
Prioritize prison space for violent and dangerous offenders.
Divert people convicted of low-level property and drug
offenses away from prison
 Create a new Class D felony category for the lowestlevel property and drug offenses, and require sentences
to CCPs instead of prison. Modify the classification of
third degree burglary to a nonviolent offense if an
individual enters an uninhabited, non-domicile building
and no person is encountered while the crime is being
committed.
 Respond to serious technical probation and parole
violations with 45-day periods of incarceration followed
by continued supervision.
Improve efficiency and transparency of the parole decisionmaking process
 Require the parole board to create structured parole
guidelines, based on current research and best
practices, to ensure consistency in the factors the parole
board considers when determining if a person is ready
for parole.
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2017
Cody Nickel,
Alabama Ends
Death Penalty
by Judicial
Override,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
2018
A Look at
What Passed
in the
Alabama
Legislature,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS

Mandate that the parole board record and share
reasons for parole denial with the person who was
denied parole, the victims, and the Department of
Corrections (DOC).
Ensure supervision for everyone upon release from prison,
and expand victim notification.
 Require people convicted of a Class C offense—which
includes property, drug, and person offenses—to serve
split sentences, which provide a fixed term of
incarceration and guarantee a period of supervision
after release from prison or jail.
 Require that people serving a straight prison sentence
receive a period of supervision upon release.
 Complete the development of the electronic victim
notification system, and expand victim notification
regarding releases from prison.
Repeal of judicial override allowing a judge to impose the
death penalty when a jury has recommended life
imprisonment.

Increased prison funding by additional $85 million for the
state prison system over the next two years.
Nitrogen Execution Bill allows the condemned to choose
execution by nitrogen hypoxia if lethal injection is
unavailable, or if they so elect.
Human Trafficking Bill enhances the penalties already in
place, increasing the offense to a Class A felony, with a
minimum jail sentence of ten years.
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APPENDIX B: RECENT MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
LEGISLATION

2018 PRISON
REFORM
LEGISLATION
BASED ON
SUMMARY BY
SENATOR
WILLIAM
BROWNSBERGER

Decriminalize minor offenses:
 Minor offenses for juveniles—civil infractions and
first offense misdemeanors with penalties under 6
months—cannot be the subject of delinquency
findings
 Disruptive behavior in school (disturbing assembly or
disorderly conduct) cannot be the subject of
delinquency findings (but more serious behavior can
still be prosecuted); Additionally, schools shall enter
MOUs with school resource officers defining nondisciplinary role of school resource officers
 Repeal offense of being in the presence of heroin
 Expand scope of good Samaritan protections to
youth alcohol and to probation violations
 Specify that use of prescribed drugs and medical
marijuana, shall not constitute a probation violation
Divert minor offenses away from prosecution and
incarceration:
 Create mechanism for judicial diversion of juveniles
for less serious offenses
 Improve and expand mechanism for district court
diversion of adults
 Eliminate defunct requirement for probation
certification of diversion programs
 Eliminate age restrictions on diversion
 Exclude serious offenses from diversion
 Assure that victims are heard in diversion
decisions
 Create legal/administrative framework to expand use
of restorative justice programs for diversion of both
juveniles and adults
 Require judges to make written findings before
imposing a sentence of incarceration of primary
caretakers of children
 Make drug diversion more workable by making it
possible for a wider range of professionals to make
findings of dependence
 Preserve powers of District Attorneys to divert cases
and manage their own diversion programs
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Require District Attorneys to develop diversion
programs for veterans and people with mental illness
or substance use disorders.
Reform Bail to reduce unnecessary incarceration:
 Codify main holding of the Brangan case – judge
should consider financial capability of defendant and
set bail only as high as needed to assure defendant’s
return
 Require that if judge needs to set unaffordable bail to
assure return, the judge make written findings that
the Commonwealth’s interest in assuring return
outweighs the harm of detention to the individual and
their family
 Allow judges to use community corrections facilities
for pre-trial release (consistent with CSG report)
 Create pre-trial services unit to remind defendants of
upcoming court dates using modern messaging
approaches
 Create commission on bail to monitor change and
suggest further improvements
Repeal/limit mandatory minimums for non-opiate, nonweight retail drug offenses:
 Limit applicability of school zone law to cases
involving guns or minors
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class B
(make fentanyl class A)
 Eliminate
mandatory
for
first
offense
cocaine/PCP/meth
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class
cocaine/PCP/meth
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class C
 Eliminate mandatory for second offense class D
 Eliminate mandatory for sales of drug paraphernalia
Strengthen minimum mandatories for opioid trafficking:
 Make all federally scheduled synthetic opioids class
A drugs in Massachusetts (if not otherwise classified
in Massachusetts)
 Include fentanyl, carfentanil and emerging synthetic
opiates in trafficking weight ladder – mixtures
containing these substances and weighing over 18g,
36g, 100g, or 200g will draw the same minimum
mandatory penalties currently applicable to mixtures
containing heroin
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Modify fentanyl trafficking statute so that it applies
to mixtures weighing over 10 grams that contain
fentanyl. Add minimum mandatory of 3.5 years,
effectively adding a special bottom rung applicable
only to fentanyl to the trafficking weight ladder. 10
grams gets 3.5 years under this section, 18 grams gets
3.5 years (from the main opioid ladder)
 Add a special minimum mandatory of 3.5 years
applicable to mixtures of any weight containing
carfentanil in any quantity but with the proviso that
the commonwealth must prove knowledge that the
mixture contained carfentanil
Strengthen Protections for Public Safety:
 Strengthen penalties for intimidation of witnesses
 Broaden eligibility for witness protection programs
 Strengthen penalties for solicitation of murder and
other crimes
 Allow district court prosecution of conspiracy,
solicitation and intimidation
 Strengthen penalties for corporate manslaughter
 Strengthen penalties for high repetition of Operating
Under the Influence (OUI) offenses
 Broaden definition of inhalants that may result in
OUI prosecution
 Strengthen penalties for reckless homicide by motor
vehicle
 Create new crime of assault and battery on police
officer causing serious injury
 Create new crime of unlawful possession of credit
card scanner
 Expand crime of providing false information to police
officer
 Disclose findings of not guilty by reason of insanity in
the same way as convictions for general employers
and landlords.
 Strengthen DNA collection procedures from serious
offenders—collect forthwith upon conviction
 Mandate better tracking and retention of rape kits
 Mandate creation of police training program for biasreduction and de-escalation
Reduce solitary confinement:
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Repeal archaic solitary confinement concept
(“isolation”) and define more humane restrictive
housing concept
 Define minimum humane conditions for restrictive
housing.
 Require that the commissioner develop regulations
“to maximize out-of-cell activities in restrictive
housing and outplacements from restrictive housing
consistent with the safety of all persons.”
 Require that prisoners confined to restrictive housing
shall, under regulations to be developed, have “access
to vocational, educational and rehabilitative
programs to the maximum extent possible consistent
with the safety and security of the unit”
 Require that prisoners confined to restrictive housing
receive regular reviews to see if they are ready to
return to general prison population and have an
opportunity to participate in those reviews
 Assure that correctional officers staffing restrictive
housing facilities have appropriate training
 Protect LGBTQ prisoners from arbitrary use of
restrictive housing
 Assure that those segregated from other inmates for
their own safety are not placed in restrictive housing,
but in conditions comparable to general population
 Create a balanced oversight board with access to
data, prison facilities and prisoners to report on
conditions in restrictive housing and progress in
reducing restrictive housing. The oversight
committee will have no authority over individual
prisoner confinement decisions
Generally improve prison conditions:
 Assure that transgender prisoners are housed with
prisoners of the same gender identity unless it would
endanger the prisoner or other prisoners
 Require that all prisoners without high school
diplomas have access to education programming
 Require that all prisoners are assessed for substance
use disorders (but do not require medically assisted
treatment)
 Preserve inmate access to regular in-person
visitation—video visits permitted, but not in lieu of in
person visits
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Expressly authorize creation of special prison units
for emerging adults (ages 18 to 24)
 Create commission to study LGBTQ prison health
 Create task force to study correctional officer
suicides
 Study prison long distance phone costs
Release prisoners who are permanently incapacitated
and pose no safety risk:
 Prisoners who are so debilitated that they do not
present a public safety risk may petition their
superintendent or sheriff for medical release
 The sheriff or superintendent shall make a
recommendation to the commissioner of correction
 The commissioner of correction will determine
whether the inmate is incapacitated and the medical
release plan is appropriate
 The parole board will supervise the released
prisoners and re-incarcerate them if they are
recovering contrary to expectations
 Judicial review is only by certiorari
Make it easier for people to get back on their feet:
1. Reduce fees imposed on defendants
 Eliminate counsel fee for juvenile defendants
 No parole fee for the first year after release from
prison
 No probation fee for the first six months after release
from prison
 Make more fees waivable and standardize waiver
language across fees
 Streamline waiver process for probation fees – no
written finding required
 Improve procedural protections for people facing
incarceration for non-payment of fines and increase
rate at which fines are worked off from $30 per day to
$90 per day
2. Ensure that when state criminal records are sealed or
expunged, national fingerprint records are also sealed or
expunged
 Require that offense based tracking number
(OBTN) associated with a set of fingerprints taken
at arrest is recorded in court files (not expand scope
of fingerprinting)
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Ensure that when cases are disposed of, the
disposition is transmitted to the national system
(using the OBTN)
 Similarly assure that sealing and expungement
orders are transmitted for parallel action in the
national system
3. Make criminal records more private
 Ensure that cases dismissed before arraignment do
not appear on criminal records
 Ensure that youthful offender cases tried in juvenile
court are treated as juvenile instead of adult CORI
 Accelerate sealing availability from 10 years to 7
years for felonies and from 5 years to 3 years for
misdemeanors.
 Fix the glitch that causes resisting arrest charges to
be non-sealable
 Allow expungement of cases involving errors of
justice
 Allow expungement of non-serious cases up to age
21 (both juveniles and young adults)
 Exclude juvenile arrests from public police log and
expunge public police logs if the court case is
expunged
 Raise threshold that defines felony larceny from
$250 to $1200, so making more cases misdemeanors
that can be quickly sealed or expunged (preserve
ability of officers to arrest defendants in cases above
$250)
 Require that licensing authorities disclose in
advance offenses that may be disqualifying
 Confirm that sealed records need not be mentioned
in applications for housing or professional licensure
 Prevent employers from inquiring about sealed or
expunged cases
 Protect employers from liability for failing to know
about cases that they are not permitted to know or
inquire about under CORI law.
4.Reduce entanglements with the registry of motor
vehicles
 No longer suspend licenses upon court defaults
 No longer suspend licenses upon conviction of
tagging or vandalism
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Assure that parents will not lose their license for
non-payment of child support if the warning notice
is going to a bad address (do not limit otherwise limit
ability of the DOR to suspend licenses)
Take better care of juveniles and young adults:
 Raise minimum age of juvenile court jurisdiction to
12
 Do not raise age of criminal adulthood to 19, but
 Expressly authorize creation of young adult units
within Houses of Correction (18-24)
 Expressly authorize designation of youth probation
officers
 Create task force to “to examine and study the
treatment and impact of individuals ages 18 to 24 in
the court system and correctional system of the
commonwealth.”
 Minimize harsh detention of minors (mostly
codifying existing good practice)
 Assure swift parental notification and appropriate
handling upon arrest
 Limit shackling in court room settings
 Prohibit housing of juveniles in contact with adults
 Prohibit the use of room confinement as a
disciplinary measure for juveniles in DYS custody
 Protect
the
parent-child
relationship
by
disqualifying parents and children from being called
to testify against each other in court (this does not
apply to domestic situations and does not prevent
parents from asking the police for assistance with
their children if necessary)
 Create a juvenile justice policy and data board to
oversee and improve treatment of juveniles.
 Create task force on trauma-informed juvenile care
 Provide access to counsel at parole hearings for
juveniles sentenced to life
Improve transparency of the criminal justice system
1. Mandate National Incident Based Reporting System
for arrests, including racial data
2. Juvenile justice policy and data board is to drive
consolidation of information about juvenile contacts with
the system
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3. Require the Secretary of Public Safety to lead
improvement of adult criminal justice data systems,
creates adult criminal justice systems board
4. Require expanded reporting on civil forfeitures.
Better protect women in the criminal justice system
1. Mentioned above: Mandate better tracking and
retention of rape kits
2. Allow vacatur of crimes committed by victims of
human trafficking
3.Create commission on justice involved women
Reduce and remedy errors of justice
1. Empower stronger oversight of forensic labs and
techniques
2. Increase access to compensation for wrongful
convictions

